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SEARCH AND SEIZURE RIGHTS OF PAROLEES AND
PROBATIONERS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent companion cases in the Ninth Circuit have shed new light on
the developing doctrine of the rights of parolees and probationers. I Both cases
involved the methods and fruits of search and seizure; both decisions analyzed
the purposes of the parole and probation systems and applied these purposes
in assessing the validity of specific searches involved. In this process, there are
the opposing considerations of the constitutionally protected individual's right
to privacy and the practical needs of the parole and probation systems. A
tentative balance has been reached2 but the weighing process is continuing.
Not all judges in the Ninth Circuit are satisfied that a proper judicial balance
has been achieved. 3
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS
"The Fourth Amendment 4 declares that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches shall not be violated .... General searches have long
been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It is plain that the Amendment
forbids them."5 This protection does not however, reach all alike-the
protection afforded parolees and probationers is different from that applicable
to ordinary citizens.
Searches of ordinary citizens in the United States must be made on
reasonable grounds based on probable cause. "Probable cause exists where
'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed." '6
Courts prefer searches to be preceded by the obtaining of search warrants,
but the great bulk of searches are made without them.7 In such cases,
reasonable grounds exist both for belief that a search will produce evidence or
1. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6,
1975); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. See Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 Stan. L.
Rev. 129 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Stanford Note].
3. In Latta, five judges joined in the majority opinion, three and two judges joined in two
concurring opinions, and three judges dissented. In Consuelo-Gonzalez, four judges joined in the
majority, two concurred, three concurred specially, three joined in dissent and one other judge
dissented separately.
4. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
5. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927) (footnote added).
6. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
7. Lockhart, Kamisar, & Choper, Constitutional Law 610 (4th ed. 1975).
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prevent harm to a law enforcement officer and for belief that the search would
be ineffective if delayed by the obtaining of a warrant. 8 Such reasonable
grounds were found where a probability of loss of evidence was due to natural
bodily functions9 and "where it [was] not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle [on the highway could] be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."'1 This reason-
ing was extended to include the warrantless search of an automobile after its
occupants were arrested and the car driven to the police station; where
probable cause to search existed, the Court saw "no [constitutional] difference
between [immobilizing] a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and [conducting] an immediate search without a warrant ...
[E]ither course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.""
Furthermore, the Court has found "ample justification. . . for a search of
[an] arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence."'1 2 However, no such justification exists for
routinely searching rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs.
13
Probable cause for searches has never been necessary where the person
searched has given his consent. When no valid consent exists and there is no
circumstance requiring an immediate search, search of premises must be
predicated on a warrant based on probable cause or reasonable grounds. 14
Thus, "[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a
8. The role of warrants in the reasonability of searches is explored in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950): "It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that
the right of the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search
warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment
is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches. It is not disputed that there may
be reasonable searches, incident to arrest, without a search warrant. Upon acceptance of this
established rule that some authority to search follows from lawfully taking the person Into
custody, it becomes apparent that such searches turn upon the reasonableness under all the
circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is
not required .... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and
circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case. It is a sufficient precaution that law officers
must justify their conduct before courts which have always been, and must be, jealous of the
individual's right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 65-66
(emphasis deleted).
9. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (withdrawal of blood for alcohol content
test).
10. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
11. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). The Court has allowed evidence to be
admitted which was discovered when police were securing an impounded car. Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). The Court has also upheld a warrantless search of a disabled car
which the police had towed to a private garage. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
12. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). From 1950 to 1969, the rule was that a
warrantless search "incident to a lawful arrest" could include the entire area in the arrestee's
general, not immediate, possession or control. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).
14. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.
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dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unques-
tionably showing probable cause."' ' Courts stress the necessity of "reasonable
grounds" and "probable cause" being determined by "a neutral and detached
magistrate."' 16 This impartiality requirement is shown in two recent contrast-
ing cases. In the first, 17 the Court concluded that the state Attorney General,
who issued search warrants, was not a neutral magistrate, especially since he
was also chief prosecutor in the case in question. In the second, 18 the Court
found that clerks of a municipal court were sufficiently removed from
prosecutor and police to be qualified as neutral magistrates to issue arrest
warrants for violation of city ordinances, since they worked within the
judicial branch and were subject to the supervision of a judge. 19
The probable cause for a warrant need not be equal to evidence sufficient to
prove guilt in a criminal case.2 0 It may be based on hearsay, but then "what is
necessary.. . is one of two things: the informant must declare either (1) that
he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his
information is hearsay, but there is good reason for believing it-perhaps one
of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information."lt2
The fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search and sei-
zure, as applied to ordinary citizens, are broad in scope, with a long history of
developing case law. The fourth amendment protection as applied to parolees
and probationers is not nearly so broad; the developing case law in this
area will now be explored.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE "TRADITIONAL VIEW"
The court in Latta v. Fitzharris, 27 citing the leading case of People v.
Hernandez,23 noted that under the traditional view of the fourth amendment,
15. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
16. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). "[Tlhe informed and deliberate determina-
tions of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible
under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may
happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort
to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting
under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime ... " United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1931), quoted in Johnson v. United States, 233 U.S. 10, 14 n.3
(1948).
17. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
19. "The assumption of appellate courts that greater protection for the individual is afforded
by the warrant procedure is unsupported by studies indicating that typically the decision to issue
a warrant is really made by the prosecutor, the judicial officer routinely signing the warrant
without any independent inquiry." Lockhart, Kamisar, & Choper, Constitutional Law 605, n.b
(4th ed. 1975).
20. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-70 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
21. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
22. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
23. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (3d DisL 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
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"parole officers have long enjoyed broad powers to search parolees under their
supervision. '24 In Hernandez, the court held that the requirement of reason-
able or probable cause was not applicable to the search of a parolee or his
automobile by his parole officer who had acted on information received
from an informer and had obtained the help of narcotics agents.
2 5
Hernandez was the culmination of a series of cases in California. People v.
Cahan26 established the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible in criminal trials.2 7 Four subsequent decisions
involving parolees' rights increasingly restricted the rule set down in Cahan. In
People v. Denne28 and two similar cases, 29 parole officers found narcotics
while searching for parole violations. The search was a by-product of the
parole officer's prior determination, upon probable cause, to apprehend the
parolee. The Denne court assumed arguendo that fourth amendment rights
could be argued by a parolee 30 but, on the facts of the case, 3 ' held that a
warrantless search by a parole officer was reasonable because of the special
relationship between the parolee and the parole officer. 32
People v. Triche33 further narrowed the fourth amendment's applicability
to parolees. 34 In Triche, the parole officer had gone to the defendant's
This case was criticized for its "traditional view." Stanford Note, supra n.2, at 132-37. The
continuing importance of this view, despite subsequent less traditional cases, is evidenced by the
Ninth Circuit's reference to it, ten years later, as "the leading case." 229 Cal. App. 2d at 143, 40
Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
24. 521 F.2d at 248.
25. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
26. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
27. Defendant Cahan was found guilty of conspiring to engage in bookmaking and related
offenses in violation of section 337a of the California Penal Code. Judge Traynor found that
evidence obtained from microphones surreptitiously placed by police officers on premises oc-
cupied by defendant and evidence obtained by numerous forcible entries and seizures without
search warrants were obtained "in flagrant violation of the United States Constitution, 4th and
14th Amendments, the California Constitution, Art. I, § 19, and state and federal statutes." Id.
at 436, 282 P.2d at 906.
28. 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (2d Dist. 1956).
29. People v. Contreras, 154 Cal. App. 2d 321, 315 P.2d 916 (3d Dist. 1957); People v.
Robarge, 151 Cal. App. 2d 660, 312 P.2d 70 (2d Dist. 1957).
30. 141 Cal. App. 2d at 506, 297 P.2d at 455.
31. Denne was released on parole subject, in part, to his not possessing, using or selling any
narcotics in violation of the law, and his avoiding former inmates of penal institutions and
individuals of bad reputation. The parole officer received information that the defendant had
been associating with former inmates who were dealing in narcotics. With the apartment
manager's permission, the parole agent climbed through a window of the defendant's apartment
and the subsequent search revealed a package of marijuana. Id. at 504-05, 297 P.2d at 454-55.
The District Court of Appeals held that since the parole officer had knowledge that the defendant
was associating with a felon currently engaged as a narcotics peddler, search by the parole officer
of the parolee's apartment in his absence was not unreasonable. Id. at 509-10, 297 P.2d at 457-58.
32. This "special relationship" is crucial to both the Latta and Consuelo-Gonzalez cases. See
notes 79-82 & 115-18 infra and accompanying text.
33. 148 Cal. App. 2d 198, 306 P.2d 616 (Ist Dist. 1957).
34. It has been said that Triche makes the fourth amendment inapplicable to parolees.
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premises in the course of surveillance and a warrantless search revealed
narcotics. These narcotics were later admitted as evidence because the search
was found to be reasonable due to the parole officer's special supervisory and
visitation powers. 35
All four post-Cahan cases assumed that there was a requirement of some
kind of probable cause, but all four found probable cause within the parolee-
parole officer relationship. 36 The Hernandez court, though it denied full
fourth amendment rights to parolees, did not abrogate all such rights:
We recognize but do not accept a dictum in People v. Goss . . . which describes the
Denne case as denying parolees Call] constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There is a marked legal distinction between arbitrary search"7
by the parole authorities whom the law .. places in control of the parolee and one by
general law enforcement officers. 38
In Hernandez, the court viewed the parolee as more akin to a prisoner than
to an ordinary citizen: "Although a parolee is not a prison inmate in the
physical sense, he is constructively a prisoner under legal custody of the State
Department of Corrections and may be returned to the prison walls without
notice and hearing." 3 9 The court here did not deny parolees all of their
constitutional rights, relying on its interpretation of the Denne decision. 40 The
court explicitly confronted both the contract4 l and the act of grace theories of
Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 702,
731 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Critique].
35. 148 Cal. App. 2d at 202, 306 P.2d at 618. These powers are part of the "special
relationship."
36. See discussion in Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d at 145-46, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 102. In
Robargo and Contreras, the special relationship had led to the parole officer's determination of
probable cause for a search. Thus the special relationship itself was not necessary as an
independent cause.
37. The arbitrariness of a parole officer's search apparently allowable under Hernandez was
changed in Latta to a minimum requirement of reasonableness based on the parole officer's
hunch. 521 F.2d at 251-52. But see Judge Choy's concurring opinion where more than a mere
hunch-and dearly not mere arbitrariness-is required. Id. at 253-54 (Choy, J., concurring).
38. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 147 n.2, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.2 (footnote added).
39. Id. at 149, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 103. In this context, the court quotes the Denne
opinion: "The parolee, although physically outside the walls, is still a prisoner, his apprehension,
although outwardly resembling arrest, is simply a rettrn to physical custody." Id. See 521 F.2d at
273-74 (Wright, J., dissenting).
40. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
41. The essence of the contract theory is that the parolee agrees to give up certain rights in
exchange, for his release from actual custody. See 521 F.2d at 274. (Wright, J.,
dissenting); Critique, supra note 34, at 703. The idea originated from the custom of having a
prisoner sign a consent form before parole. The inequality of bargaining power between the
parolee and the state, which would negate any such contract, is discussed in Hahn v. Burke, 430
F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S 933 (1971). See Comment, Judicial Review of
Probation Conditions, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 191-92 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Review]; Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 282, 287 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
The Parole System]; Note, The Impossible Dream?: Due Process Guarantees for California
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parole, 42 seeing the latter as making constitutional rights dependent upon a
kind of forced " 'contract' in which one side has all the bargaining power. 43
Rejecting such a view, the court said that
the state may not attach unconstitutional conditions to the grant of state privileges ...
The problem should be approached by considering what constitutional guaranties the
individual may claim as a paroled prisoner of the state, not what contitutional liberties
he surrendered as a condition of parole.
44
The Latta court quoted from Hernandez to show the traditional view of
parolees' rights. 45 However, there is also in Hernandez a condemnation of the
Parolees and Probationers, 25 Hastings L.J. 602, 606 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hastings Note].
42. According to this theory, the parolee is not physically in jail because of the "grace" or
benevolence of the state. Therefore the parolee has no legally protected right to remain at liberty.
In the words of Justice Cardozo: "[W]e do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege
has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions In respect
of its duration as Congress may impose." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935) (dictum).
A similar description is in Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1908). See People v.
Chinnici, 51 Misc. 2d 570, 273 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Nassau County Ct. 1966); White, The Fourth
Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 167 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as White]; Judicial Review, supra note 41, at 200; The Parole System, supra note 41, at 286-87;
Hastings Note, supra note 41, at 604-06; 39 Mo. L. Rev. 640, 641 n.9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Procedural Due Process]. The growth and decline of the right-privilege distinction is discussed In
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1439 (1968).
The Hernandez and Denne courts saw the parolee through the "constructive custody" theory.
The Triche court also described the parolees as in a prison without bars. Judge Hufstedler of the
Ninth Circuit added further dimension to the theory: " 'A parolee does not stand discharged from
prison, but merely serves the remainder of his sentence outside rather than within the prison
walls. He is at all times in custodia legis and his physical apprehension by a parole officer is not
arrest.' " People v. Limon, 255 Cal. App. 2d 321, 63 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (2d Dist. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 866 (1968), quoting People v. Quilon, 245 Cal. App. 2d 624, 627, 54 Cal. Rptr.
294, 297 (1st Dist. 1966). A main criticism of the theory is that protection against unreasonable
searches is a fundamental constitutional right. White, supra, at 178-81, referring to Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Also, parolees are not
equivalent to prisoners because they do not require the same degree of control. White, supm, at
180. The custody theory was substantially destroyed in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
The court in Latta disagreed with the theory. See text accompanying note 58 infra. See also
Hastings Note, supra note 41, at 607-08; The Parole System, supra note 41, at 286-95.
43. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 148, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
44. Id.
45. "For the purpose of maintaining the restraints and social safeguards accompanying the
parolee's status, the authorities may subject him, his home and his effects to such constant or
occasional inspection and search as may seem advisable to them .... He may not assert [fourth
amendment] guaranties against the correctional authorities who supervise him on parole. . . .If
this constitutional fact strips him of constitutional protection against invasions of privacy by his
parole officer, the answer is that he has at least as much protection as he had within prison walls.
He did not possess this guaranty in prison and it was not restored to him when the gates of parole
opened." 521 F.2d at 248, quoting 229 Cal. App. 2d at 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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abrogation of parolees' rights and the germ of a less severe interpretation of
those rights. 46 The Hernandez court also limited its holding by concluding
that the requirement of reasonable or probable cause does not apply to search
of a paroled prisoner when conducted by his parole supervisor-other law
enforcement officials are not included in this exception.4
7
People v. Rosales48 granted fourth amendment protection to parolees by
requiring law enforcement officers to announce their purpose before entering a
parolee's home to conduct a search, in accordance with section 844 of the
California Penal Code. 49 The Supreme Court subsequently held that due
process had to be met when parole was revoked, 50 requiring "basic fairness"
in the treatment of parolees. s However, full fourth amendment protections
are still somewhat limited when a court is confronted with a search of a
parolee or a probationer by his parole or probation officer, as evidenced by
two recent Ninth Circuit decisions.
IV. THE FIRST DECISION: Latta v. Fitzharris52
In April 1966, Latta was on parole from imprisonment under a California
armed robbery conviction. His parole officer arrested him at the house of an
acquaintance for violating the conditions of his parole.5 3 When arrested,
Latta was holding a pipe containing marijuana. About six hours after the
arrest, Latta's parole officer and two local police officers went to Latta's
home, about thirty miles away. No one was present at the house, but Latta's
stepdaughter soon arrived and admitted them. They identified themselves,
46. The Latta court, while following such implications, did not acknowlege them.
47. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104. In addition, Hernandez is limited to
parolees' rights, separating them from probationers' rights.
48. 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
49. One commentator thought Rosales introduced the possibility of variable standards for
searches of parolees. Stanford Note, supra note 2, at 140. He foresaw normal probable cause for
general parole searches and seizures, and "variable probable cause" for exceptional cases. In cases
where parole/probation administration functions would be served by alloning invasions of
privacy, a variable probable cause concept might supply the necessary constitutional justification.
Id. at 137-40. The primary problem in using this approach is the determination of when
circumstances are so exceptional as to allow less-than-strict interpretation of the fourth
amendment's probable cause requirement. The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have not
followed this concept.
Others felt that Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), would lead to decisions
requiring reasonableness and a warrant for searches by parole officers. See generally White, supra
note 42, at 193-97. The author felt that the parole officer could learn enough about his parolee
without a search; if he needed more information, he could get a warrant. Id. This prognosis has
also proven inaccurate.
50. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
51. 408 U.S. at 484.
52. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
53. Id. at 247. Whether or not the violations of parole which were the cause for this arrest
coincided with the subsequent drug law violations is not clear from the opinion. Since no question
was raised as to the validity of the arrest, the question of probable cause for the arrest did not
arise. All discussion centered on the subsequent search.
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told her that they were there to conduct a search and that a warrant was
unnecessary. The search produced a four-and-one-half pound brick of
marijuana, which became the basis of Latta's later state conviction for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 54
Latta made two arguments on appeal: "first, that his parole officer's
warrantless search of his home violated the Fourth Amendment . .. and
second, assuming that the search was valid, that the evidence that was seized
could only be used as a basis for revoking his parole." s The Ninth Circuit
held that, once the search is decided to be lawful, the second of Latta's
contentions is without merit.5 6 The court however, went into great detail in
analyzing the fourth amendment issue.
A. Limitations on the Traditional View
The Latta court specificially limited the traditional view as espoused in
Hernandez, and followed prior decisions which held that parolees are entitled
to fourth amendment protection in-certain situations.5 7 The court impliedly
agreed with those who have criticized the notion that the status of parolees is
legally comparable to that of prisoners in actual custody, treating this aspect
of Hernandez as ''logically inconsistent and ignoring reality."3 8 In expanding
the rights of parolees, the court favorably cited the Supreme Court's statement
that parole officers do not "have unfettered discretion in dealing with
parolees . . . ."5 Following this view, Latta held that fourth amendment
rights are applicable to parolees, and that "such searches [of parolees] may be
54. Latta appealed from an order of the district court denying his application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. For a discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule and the writ of
habeas corpus, see Note, The Threatened Future of State Prisoners' Fourth Amendment Rights
Exercised Through Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 New England L. Rev. 433 (1974).
55. 521 F.2d at 248.
56. Id. at 252-53. The court referred to its previous ruling in United States
v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 n.44 (9th Cir. 1973). However, California courts have held
that an "unconstitutional seizure places the articles [of evidencel permanently beyond the pale of
admissibility." People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 689, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787 (3d Dist.
1969).
57. 521 F.2d at 248.
58. Id. For criticisms of this notion, see White, supra note 42, at 178-81; The Parole System,
supra note 41, at 289-96; Critique, supra note 34, at 704-08.
59. 521 F.2d at 248, referring to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-84 (1972).
Morrissey's parole was revoked only on the recommendation of his parole officer-there
was no hearing. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger disregarded theories which hinge on
fine verbal distinctions but rather saw procedural protections as dependent on the extent of loss
an individual might suffer. Id. at 481. "[Dlue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands. '[Clonsideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.' " Id., quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961). The Morrissey Court thus looked to the factual situation to determine the extent to
which constitutional rights may be altered.
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held illegal and the evidence obtained therefrom suppressed unless they pass
muster under the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness." 60
B. The Standard of Reasonableness
It was apparent that the search in Latta was not justifiable on the basis of
the traditional standard of probable cause, but the court emphasized that the
search was not therefore invalid: "A California parolee is in a different
position from that of the ordinary citizen. He is still serving his sentence. He
remains under the ultimate control of the Adult Authority and the immediate
control of his parole officer. His parole is subject to revocation for reasons
that would not permit the arrest or incarceration of other persons."'6' The
restrictions on parole are directly related to its purposes; 62 the Latta court
analyzed the reasonableness of the search restriction with a view to these
purposes. 63 Such analysis is consistent with Morrissey v. Brewer64 where the
Supreme Court held that the purpose of parole "is to help individuals
reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able,
without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It also serves
to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an individual in prison." 65 The
Latta court did not consider the financial cost to society, but did discuss
briefly the parole officer's duty to protect society from recidivist parolees. 66 It
focused instead on rehabilitation: "To the extent that there is a 'law
enforcement' emphasis, it is to deter the parolee from returning to a life of
crime. '67 The Latta majority adopted the constructive approach of Morrissey,
holding that the "overriding goal of the parole system is to give the parolee a
chance to further and to demonstrate his rehabilitation while serving a part of
his sentence outside the prison walls.1 68
To satisfy these goals, the court then proceeded to balance two conflicting
interests. First, it found that the parole authorities have a
special and unique interest in invading the privacy of parolees under their supervision.
In order to fulfill his dual responsibilities for helping the parolee to reintegrate into
society and evaluating his progress, and for preventing possible further antisocial or
criminal conduct by the parolee, it is essential that the parole officer have a thorough
understanding of the parolee and his environment, including his personal habits, his
relationships with other persons, and what he is doing, both at home and outside it. 69
60. 521 F.2d at 248-49.
61. Id. at 249.
62. Conditions must be shaped to correctional and rehabilitative needs both because such is
constitutionally required and because other conditions are dysfunctional to the rehabilitative goals
of parole. The Parole System, supra note 41, at 376.
63. 521 F.2d at 249-50.
64. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
65. Id. at 477.
66. 521 F.2d at 249.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. While Latta can be considered a "modernizing" of Hernandez, the incorporation
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The second interest considered is the parolee's right to protect his personal
privacy. 70 The court again followed Morrissey:
"The parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows
reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible,
self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully
employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restric-
tions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of
confinement in a prison."
7
'
In the case of parolee Latta, the court felt that one of the conditions of
parole necessary for the effective operation of the system was the subjection of
Latta and his home to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably
believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties. 7 2 The
court was careful, however, to say that such searches are subject to abuse
which could defeat the purposes of parole. 73 The principal protection against
abuse 74 is the parole officer's training. He should act as a guide and
helpmate-not as a policeman. 75
C. The Warrant Requirement-
The Parallel of Administrative Searches
The court in Latta followed California precedent holding that a parole
officer need not obtain a warrant before searching his parolee or his parolee's
home. 76 It stated that search of a parolee has characteristics of an ordinary
of the prevention of recidivism as a goal of parole is, apparently, more "traditional" than the
Morrissey view.
70. See Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 Yale L.J. 698, 700 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
71. 521 F.2d at 250, quoting 408 U.S. at 482.
72. Id. The majority considered even a "hunch" as a possibly reasonable basis. On this point
Justices Choy and Merrill dissented. See text accompanying note 124 infra.
73. 521 F.2d at 252. A similar warning is found in Morrissey: "Society has a further
interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will
enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." 408 U.S. at 484.
74. A further protection, if needed, might be afforded by a change in evidentiary rules. See
United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
75. This is the distinction downplayed by the Consuelo-Gonzalez dissent. 521 F.2d at 268-76
(Wright, J., dissenting).
76. 521 F.2d at 250, citing People v. Taylor, 266 Cal. App. 2d 14, 71 Cal. Rptr.
886 (2d Dist. 1968) and People v. Limon, 255 Cal. App. 2d 519, 63 Cal. Rptr. 91 (2d Dist.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 866 (1968). In Taylor, Judge Hufstedler found that there is no legal barrier
to the parole officer's unrestricted search of his parolee's residence, except under section 844 of the
California Penal Code: "[tlo make an arrest . . . a peace officer, may break open the door or
window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable
grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose
for which admittance is desired." 266 Cal. App. 2d at 17 n.3, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 887 n.3. The
officer had knocked on a door which was already ajar and which further opened; the officers then
entered. Section 844 thus was not violated. Id. at 17, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 888. Contrast People v.
Olivas, 266 Cal. App. 2d 380, 72 Cal. Rptr. 109 (2d Dist. 1968).
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search (fourth amendment rights require some reasonableness) and of an
administrative search (warrant sometimes required),77 but held that searches
of parolees "must be governed by unique, separate, and distinct rules."7 8 The
basis of such rules is the special relationship between the parole officer and
parolee. 7 9 Because of the closeness of such a relationship, if a warrant were
required, any suspicion of a parole officer would be grounds for a magistrate
to issue a warrant. The magistrate would always issue a warrant at a parole
officer's request and the warrant would be reduced to a "paper tiger. °80 Yet,
harassment and intimidation are still not allowed.8 1 Complete searches of
parolees and their homes are permitted only for good cause. Further, parole
officers are not allowed to act as police surrogates.8 2 Vigilance in protecting
In Limon, Judge Hufstedler also found that search and seizure of heroin, made by a parole
officer and police officers when they broke into the defendant's room to arrest him for a parole
violation, was legal where evidence disclosed that the defendant saw his parole officer accom-
panied by a police officer when the defendant's door was opened by the defendant's companion.
Since the defendant knew both the identity and the purpose of the callers, there was no violation
of section 844. The court stated: "[The parole officer] was entitled to search Limon and his
apartment without a search warrant, without Limon's consent and without probable cause." 255
Cal. App. 2d at 322, 63 CaL Rptr. at 93. Hernandez had eliminated the need for probable cause
because of the parole officer-parolee relationship. See text accompanying note 47 supra. In
searches of the parolee by the parole officer, "[tlhe decisive question... is not whether the parole
officer had probable cause for an arrest and incidental search, but whether his paroled prisoner
could invoke constitutional barriers against the search." People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d
143, 148, 40 CaL Rptr. 100, 103 (3d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). While
probable cause is not required in a parole officer's search of his parolee, the parolee still "may be
able to assert constitutional guaranties and safeguards against arbitrary or oppressive official
action." Id. at 149, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
77. See notes 90-101 infra and accompanying text.
78. 521 F.2d at 251.
79. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
80. 521 F.2d at 252. For a discussion of analogous "rubber stamp" warrants
in administrative cases, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
81. This principle was asserted in The Parole System, supra note 41, at 327.
82. The court in Latta distinguished those cases "in which the parole officer was a stalking
horse for the police." 521 F.2d at 247. In United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289
(3d Cir. 1966), a warrant for arrest came after police acquired evidence against the defendant
and elicited from the parole officer a request that they bring the defendant to his office without
arresting him. The court found that "[t]he veil afforded by Provenzano's position as Hallman's
parole officer cannot here serve as a shield against what was plainly the action of the arresting
officers to effect an illegal search." Id. at 292.
In People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (3d Dist. 1969), a search of the
defendantes house was held illegal when the defendant was in jail and the police had ample time
and opportunity to secure a search warrant. "They chose the parole agent rather than a search
warrant as their ticket of entry to the [defendant's] apartment." Id. at 689, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
The court rejected the view "that a parole officer's physical presence or his delegation of authority
to the police validates the search without regard to its instigating source." Id. at 688, 82 Cal.
Rptr. at 786. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); People v. Sandoval, 65 Cal. 2d 303, 419 P.2d 187, 54 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 948 (1967); People v. Gallegos, 62 Cal. 2d 176, 397 P.2d 174, 41 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1964);
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state parolees from harassing searches is made the responsibility of parole
authorities and the California courts83 -not the federal courts.
While not relying on federal administrative search cases, and referring to
them as providing only "raw matter" for consideration of parolee searches, the
Ninth Circuit nevertheless stressed the consistency of its parolee search
decision with previous Supreme Court administrative warrantless search
cases. In Wyman v. James 4 a warrant was not required for a home visit by it
welfare worker. The Latta court quoted from Wyman to show that in certain
situations (e.g., checking of home environment) probable cause cannot be
found, yet visitation is necessary for the welfare of the one being searched and
for society in general. "In this setting the warrant argument is out of
place."' s Actual searches-and warrant requirements-were involved in two
earlier Supreme Court cases. In Camara v. Municipal Court86 it was held that
a building owner had the right to insist that a building code inspector obtain a
search warrant 87 and in See v. City of Seattle,88 a warrant was required for
unconsented administrative entry and inspection of private commercial
premises. 89
Yet, in 1970 the Supreme Court in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States9" held that a warrantless non-forcible entry would be lawful to check
for illegal liquor on a commercial premise. 91 Further, in United States v.
Biswell,92 it was held that the warrantless but non-forcible search of a locked
storeroom during business hours, as part of an inspection procedure au-
People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866
(1964); People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1st Dist. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968). For analysis of how a Hernandez-type search can be distorted, see
The Parole System, supra note 41, at 328-29.
83. For a discussion of the value of judicial responsibility in the granting of parole, see
Fairbanks, Parole-A Function of the Judiciary?, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 634, 651-59 (1974); Tile
Parole System, supra note 41, at 376.
84. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
85. Id. at 324, cited in 521 F.2d at 251.
86. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
87. Id. at 540. There were three persuasive factors which combined to support the reason-
ableness of the area code-enforcement inspection in Camara: the long history of judicial and
public acceptance of such programs; the public interest that all dangerous conditions be prevented
or abated; and the relatively limited invasion of privacy because building inspections are not
personal in nature and are not aimed at discovery of criminal evidence. Id. at 537. The
third factor contrasts with Latta's situation: there the search was personal and aimed at discovery
of evidence. Yet no warrant was required for a parole officer to search. This highlights the
importance which courts have afforded the parole officer-parolee relationship.
88. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
89. Id. at 545-46.
90. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
91. In this case, however, forcible entry was made; the Court found that Congress had not
expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant but had instead given
government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors
under 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1970). Id. at 77. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and
the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61
Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1018-19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
92. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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thorized by section 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 93 was not violative
of the fourth amendment. Distinguishing See, the Court stated that there was
no occasion in that case to consider the reach of the fourth amendment with
respect to various federal regulatory agencies. However, in Biswell there was
statutory authorization for a warrantless inspection of a federally licensed gun
dealer, similar to the authorization for inspection of federally licensed al-
coholic beverages dealers94 found in the Colonnade case. Thus, "officers...
were merely asserting their statutory right, and respondent was on notice as to
their identity and the legal basis for their action. . . In neither case does the
lawfulness of the search depend on consent; in both, there is lawful authority
independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being
equal, prefer no search at all."s The large interests at stake and the fact that
inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme were important factors in
Biswell.96 The analogous crucial role of parole inspections was vital to the
reasoning in Latta.97 Both the safety of society and the rehabilitation of the
parolee are vital interests in the parole officer-parolee relationship.
In Biswell, frequent and unexpected inspections were absolutely necessary
to the accomplishment of the statute's purpose. 9 8 The dealer, moreover, had a
copy of the relevant ordinance and was not left to wonder about the purpose
of the inspection or the limits of the inspector's task. 99 In these respects, the
situation in Latta was far more like that in Biswell: unexpected inspections
were necessary for proper information; the parolee was aware that such
inspections might occur; such inspections were required to be reasonable.10 0
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1970), as amended, (Supp. M, 1973).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1970). See note 91 supra.
95. 406 U.S. at 314-15.
96. Id. at 315.
97. 521 F.2d at 252.
98. 406 U.S. at 316. Whether they had to be warrantless inspections is not as clear- "Bisweil's
response was to label inspection as 'crucial' and to give the citizen only the protection provided by
the statute, which included neither warrant nor probability requirement-a result foreshadowed
by Colonnade. . . . T]he court failed to recognize that some form of warrant procedure and
accompanying probability decision, perhaps different from that traditionally followed, could
provide useful citizen protection without undermining the inspection program." Greenberg, supra
note 91, at 1021-22.
99. 406 U.S. at 316.
100. Although border searches have separate requirements under the fourth amendment,
border police searching cars for contraband might also require surprise inspections. But when the
police searched a randomly selected car 25 miles from the border, the Supreme Court held that
search unconstitutional. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Court
stated that the border patrol used unfettered discretion in searching without a warrant, probable
cause or consent. "The search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it
insisted that the 'discretion of the official on the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant
prior to the inspection." Id. at 270. Colonnade and Biswell were inapposite in that licensed
businessmen accepted the burdens and benefits of their trade and officers knew for a certainty
that liquor and gun businesses were carried on. Id. In Latta, the parolee accepted the
burdens and benefits of his situation and the parole officer had a reasonable basis (even more than
a hunch) for his search. The Latta situation is sufficiently distinguishable from that in Almeida-
Sanchez so as to account for the differences in result.
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Insofar as a parallel may be drawn between administrative searches and
parolee searches,' 0' therefore, Latta is in accord with recent Supreme Court
decisions.
V. THE SECOND DECISION:
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez1
0 2
Between November 15, 1972, and December 18, 1972, agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs received information that
Virginia Consuelo-Gonzalez was actively engaged in the importation and sale
of heroin. Records of the United States Attorney's Office revealed to the
agents that the defendant had previously been convicted of heroin smuggling
under another name and was currently on probation. The agents also learned
that a condition of her probation was that she submit her person and property
to search at any time upon request by a law enforcement officer.' 0 3 On
December 19, 1972, federal and local law enforcement officers visited the
Consuelo-Gonzalez residence for the purpose of searching the premises. The
front door was ajar and the agents knocked. When Consuelo-Gonzalez
appeared, an agent showed his identification, informed her that he knew of
her probation and its conditions, and indicated his intention to conduct a
search. A thorough search of the house produced a narcotics injection outfit
and 11.7 grams of heroin. This evidence provided the basis for her conviction
for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. The Ninth Circuit held that
the search in this case was unreasonable and that evidence seized should have
been suppressed by the trial court.10 4
This case differs from Latta in that Consuelo-Gonzalez was on probation,
not parole. The court assumed that probationers and parolees are to be
treated equally in this search context. 05 However, probation status should be
distinguished from parole because the Federal Probation Act' 0 6 gave new
101. For another view of administrative searches, see 521 F.2d at 255-57. (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting).
102. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 261.
104. Id. at 263.
105. Id. at 264-66. However, some distinction between probation and parole can be made. "A
principal distinction is that a 'parole' operates prior to the expiration and after the commencement
of the service of sentence; and 'probation' is granted prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to
the commencement of the service of a sentence imposed." State v. Brantley, 353 S.W.2d 793, 795
(Mo. 1962). This is a very real distinction, reinforced by the existence of federal law governing
probation and not parole. See People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr.
100, 104 (3d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). Most authority, however, is in accord
with the majority view in Consuelo-Gonzalez. "[T]he one thing all parolees and probationers
have in common [is that] they have been convicted of a crime. It is for this reason that they may
be singled out and their constitutional rights restricted where important public interests would be
served." 521 F.2d at 275. (Wright, J., dissenting). In deciding another case (Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)), "the Court could not perceive any relevant difference between parole
and probation revocations." Procedural Due Process, supra note 42, at 642; Hastings Note, supra
note 41, at 603-04, 615-17.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Upon entering a judgment of
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dimensions to the reasonableness consideration discussed in Latta. The
determinations of reasonableness in Latta and unreasonableness in
Consuelo-Gonzalez hinge upon a difference of fact- the search in Latta was by
Latta's parole officer; the search in Consuelo-Gonzalez was by federal and
local law enforcement officers.
A. The Federal Probation Act-An Added Basis for Judgment
The Consuelo-Gonzalez majority reviewed the purpose of the 1925 Federal
Probation Act by quoting from United States v. Murray. 107 Probation pro-
vides "an amelioration of the sentence by delaying actual execution or
providing a suspension so that the stigma might be withheld and an oppor-
tunity for reform and repentance be granted before actual imprisonment
should stain the life of the convict."10 Subsequent amendments have not
affected the preeminence of rehabilitation as a purpose of the act.'0 9 The
actual methods for producing such rehabilitation are not clearly delineated,
and a "court is permitted to impose such terms and conditions as it 'deems
best.' "110 There are certain restrictions, however, imposed upon the court's
discretion.1" All conditions, when considered in context, must contribute
significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the
protection of the public.11 2 Any conditions not contributing to rehabilitation
and protection are not permissible."13 Therefore, the Federal Probation Act
conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having
jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best."
107. 275 U.S. 347 (1928).
108. Id. at 357, quoted in 521 F.2d at 263.
109. See 521 F.2d at 263 & n.5. Similar purposes are evident in state laws and the Model
Penal Code. Id. at 263-64 & nn.7-8.
110. Id. at 264.
111. See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333-34 (10th Cir. 1971) (forbidding imposition of a
condition restricting freedom of speech so long as defendant did not urge others to violate the
law); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (affirming prisoner's
right to receive periodicals).
112. The Consuelo-Gonzaez court substantiated this principle: "The sentencing judge has a
broad power to impose conditions designed to serve the accused and the community. The only
limitation is that the conditions have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and
the protection of the public." 521 F.2d at 264, quoting Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th
Cir. 1971).
113. The Consuelo-Gonzalez case involves probation regulations but comparison may be
made with parole rules. For an overview of rules in different states, see Arluke, A Summary of
Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 Crime and Delinquency 267 (1969). There has been an
increase in the number of rules in various states, perhaps because the courts have become more
concerned with the rights of convicted prisoners and parolees. "It is now becoming more and
more necessary to prove in court that specific regulations have been violated--and the more
specific the regulation, the easier it is to prove the violation." Id. at 267. Insight into parole
regulations may be gained from Milligan, California's Parole Rules, 15 Crime and Delinquency
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was used by the Consuelo-Gonzalez majority as another approach to the
"reasonableness" analysis of the majority in Latta.
B. Constitutional Rights and the
Law Enforcement Aspects of Probation
The Consuelo-Gonzalez court noted that conditions of probation which limit
an individual's fundamental rights are not automatically suspect:
[T]he crucial determination in testing probationary conditions is not the degree of
"preference" which may be accorded those rights limited by the condition, but rather
whether the limitations are primarily designed to affect the rehabilitation of the
probationer or insure the protection of the public.114
The court applied the Latta method of resolving the conflict between the
practical needs of the parole/probation system, which requires visits and
searches, and the parolee's/probationer's constitutional rights. The unique
relationship which exists between parolee and parole officer also exists be-
tween probationer and probation officer." 5 Thus, if the search in Consuelo-
Gonzalez had been carried out by the probation officer, it would probably
have been held proper. But the probation officer did not initiate the search,
was not present at the search, and apparently did not even know of the
search. The unique relationship between parole/probation officers and those
under their guidance does not extend to law enforcement officers generally.
Therefore the search of Consuelo-Gonzalez conducted by the police officers
was illegal and the evidence obtained had to be suppressed. 1 6 In addition,
the terms of probation allowing searches of the probationer at any time by any
law enforcement officer were found to be unreasonable in relation to the
purposes of the Federal Probation Act. 117
While the Consuelo-Gonzalez court realized that no one rule would give
275 (1969), where the author states that "California conditions of parole are not harsh or intended
to be unduly restrictive. They are designed mainly to protect society and to serve as guidelines for
the parolee as he begins his life anew." Id. at 282. Nevertheless, the parolee's "Civil Rights have
been suspended by law'-including the right to marry, to engage in business, and to sign certain
contracts unless they are restored with official approval. Id. at 280.
114. 521 F.2d at 265 n.14. In applying this method of determination, the court dismissed the
custody and contract theories as inappropriate to the probation setting. Id. at n. 15. Latta held
these theories inappropriate in the parole setting. See notes 58 & 59 supra and accompanying text.
115. 521 F.2d at 265-66. The majority in Latta said that "the parolee and his home are
subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is
necessary in the performance of his duties." 521 F.2d at 250. But the Consuelo-Gonzalez majority
interpreted this "reasonable belief" to mean "a parole officer need not have probable cause." 521
F.2d at 265. The two views do not seem identical. Judges Choy and Merrill, concurring in Latta,
objected to a "hunch" as being reasonable; they could not accept a complete absence of probable
cause. 521 F.2d at 253-54. Judge Sneed tried to reconcile the views by stating that probable cause
would not be necessary if the probation officer has a reasonable belief that the search is required
to perform his duties properly. 521 F.2d at 266. This still seems to be a modification of the stricter
view of Hernandez. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
116. 521 F.2d at 266.
117. Id. at 262-63.
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unambiguous guidance to the probation officer, it suggested a condition for
Consuelo-Gonzalez' probation which would reflect the court's views: "That
she submit to search of her person or property conducted in a reasonable
manner and at a reasonable time by a probation officer." ' ", Therefore,
searches conducted in the absence of probable cause must be made by
probation officers, at a reasonable time, and in a reasonable manner. "Rea-
sonableness," therefore, is to be defined by the probation officer at the time of
the search, and later by the overseeing court.
VI. THE "MINORITY" OPINIONS
The discussion thus far has centered on the majority opinions of the Latta
and Consuelo-Gonzalez cases. In reality, only a minority of judges fully
concurred in the "majority" opinions. In Latta, 1 9 three judges agreed with
the result but did not think that the parole officer-parolee relationship was so
special that only parole officers should be allowed to initiate searches. They
felt that it would also be proper for the parole officer to search at the
suggestion of the police.1 20 Two other judges concurred but noted that there
was no need for the majority to speak of mere hunches as a possible basis for
search.121 Three judges dissented on the grounds that the parole officer should
not be able to search the parolee without clear probable cause and without a
warrant; they objected to the standard of reasonableness being subject to only
an ex post facto determination.122
In Consuelo-Gonzalez, five separate opinions were filed. 12 3 The same two
judges disputed that a "hunch" could justify a search, even by a probation
officer. 12 4 The dissenters in Latta concurred specially in Consuelo-Gonzalez;
consistent with their dissent in Latta, they felt that the search would still have
been illegal even if a probation officer, rather than state and federal law
enforcement officers, had made it. 12 5 Judge Chambers' 2 6 suggested that
policemen should be able to conduct searches, since probation officers "should
play the role of being the defendant's pal and not his jailer."' 27
118. Id. at 263.
119. Judges Duniway, Koelsch, Trask, Goodwin, and Sneed joined in the majority opinion.
Judges Wright, Chambers and Wallace concurred. Judges Choy and Merrill concurred separate-
ly. Judges Hufstedler, Browning and Ely dissented.
120. 521 F.2d at 253. (Wright, Chambers & Wallace, JJ., concurring).
121. Id. (Choy & Merrill, JJ., concurring).
122. Id. at 254 (Hufstedler, Browning & Ely, JJ., dissenting).
123. Judges Sneed, Koelsch, Duniway and Trask joined in the majority opinion. Judges Choy
and Merrill concurred. Judges Hufstedler, Browning, and Ely concurred specially. Judge
Chambers dissented, as did Judges Wright, Goodwin, and Wallace.
124. 521 F.2d at 267. (Choy & Merrill, JJ., concurring).
125. Id. (Hufstedler, Browning & Ely, JJ., concurring specially).
126. In Latta, Judge Chambers felt the parole officer should be able to search at the
suggestion of the police.
127. 521 F.2d at 276 (Chambers, J., dissenting). Judge Chambers also stated that the
liberalizing of search requirements "will result in more trial judges sending more defendants to
prison where they will have very little Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
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The issue of the parole/probation officer's role, raised by Judge Chambers,
was discussed in detail' 28 by Judges Wright, Wallace 129 and Goodwin.'
3 0 If
the trial judge cannot prescribe reasonable probation conditions, he may feel
that public safety will be endangered and therefore order commitment rather
than probation. A probation officer needs help in order to function effectively
as guardian of the public and rehabilitator of the convicted. In many states,
these judges felt, probation officers do not have the close, unique relationship
which is assumed in the majority opinion in both cases. Home visits rarely
take place, particularly in remote areas. Thus, the judges suggest, it is more
reasonable for probationers
to be under regular observation by law enforcement officers who, in turn, would be
expected to communicate violations or crisis situations to the nearest probation
officers. Similarly, it would be law enforcement officers who should know when, if and
how to make a search.... [S]earches by law enforcement officials can often serve the
same purposes as those made by probation officers and generally can be carried out
more efficiently, thoroughly, safely, and with less damage to the probationer-probation
officer relationship. 13
The logic of this dissent is compelling, since it is true that not all probation
officers can visit their probationers in the manner ideally envisioned by the
majority. However, confusing the functions of a parole/probation officer with
those of a policeman will lead to confusion of what should be sharply
delineated functions: to what extent can a policeman effectively serve as a
parole/probation officer and vice versa?
VII. CURRENT STATUS OF PAROLEES' AND
PROBATIONERS' RIGHTS
The Latta court did not decide the extent of a parole officer's authority to
enter a home forcibly without a warrant. 132 The Consuelo-Gonzalez court
similarly stated that it expressed "no opinion here regarding the extent to
which the states constitutionally may impose conditions more intrusive on the
probationer's privacy than those we here have indicated are proper under the
Federal Probation Act.' 1 33 Finally, Consuelo-Gonzalez did not decide "the
issue of whether contraband found as a result of an improper probation search
may be considered in a probation revocation proceeding."1 34 These issues
must await further decisions for clarification. 13 5
128. Id. at 268-76 (Wright, J., dissenting).
129. Judges Chambers and Wallace joined with Judge Wright in the Latta concurring
opinion.
130. Judge Goodwin joined in the Latta majority opinion.
131. 521 F.2d at 271, 273 (Wright, J., dissenting).
132. 521 F.2d at 252 n.2. Cf. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
133. 521 F.2d at 266. The court also expressed no opinion regarding the California Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1016 (1972), where contraband seized in a search pursuant to a probation condition
similar to that in Consuelo-Gonzalez was used to obtain a revocation of the probation. 521 F.2d
at 266.
134. 521 F.2d at 267.
135. The Ninth Circuit has since held that improperly seized evidence may be admitted in
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PAROLEES AND PROBATIONERS
Parolees and probationers have been slowly gaining fourth amendment
rights. In People v. Rosales,136 the California court required that statutory
announcement rules be applied to parolees. In addition, the Supreme Court in
Morrissey1 37 applied fourth amendment rights to parolees in a parole revo-
cation situation. Now the Ninth Circuit has given dimension to the concept of
"reasonableness" in the search of parolees/probationers. Searches by law
enforcement officers must meet full fourth amendment standards applicable to
searches of ordinary citizens. But searches by the parole/probation officer do
not need to meet full probable cause standards because of the special
relationship between the parole/probation officer and the parolee/
probationer. 38 This relationship is vital to the fulfillment of the purposes of
parole-rehabilitation and the protection of society.1 39 Since the protective
purpose only emerges if the rehabilitative purpose fails, the Ninth Circuit has
stressed the rehabilitative function.140 The parole/probation officer's primary
role, then, is to help the parolee/probationer become a useful citizen. The
trust implicit in such a relationship is not furthered by harassment or
"stalking horse" policies which are clearly unreasonable. The court in
Consuelo-Gonzalez added the further requirements of reasonable manner and
reasonable time. 14 ' The constitutional protections generally available to
parolees/probationers, the law enforcement process as it relates to probation,
and the Federal Probation Act support the courts reasonableness standards.142
The fact that a parolee/probationer enjoys fourth amendment rights is no
longer disputed. These rights are modified, however, by the relationship he
has with his parole/probation officer. The key, then, to what is reasonable-in
manner, time or any other aspect-is the role of the parole/probation officer,
which has not been clearly delineated. The Morrissey court spoke of this role:
The parole officers are part of the administrative system designed to assist parolees and
to offer them guidance. The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; they prohibit,
either absolutely or conditionally, behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration
of the individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the
parole officer and seeking guidance and permission before doing many things, the
officer is provided with information about the parolee and an opportunity to advise
probation revocation hearings and subsequent sentencing. United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d
1019 (9th Cir. 1975).
136. 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1968). See notes 48 & 49 supra and
accompanying text
137. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See notes 50, 64-65 & 71 supra and
accompanying text.
138. The Latta majority further qualified this in stating that the court will not uphold every
search by a parole officer. An unqualified holding would "practically gut the principle that
parolees are entitled to some privacy. Moreover, it would not advance the goals of the parole
system." 521 F.2d at 252. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
140. 521 F.2d at 249; 521 F.2d at 263. But see the discussion of recidivism and the need for
alertness in protecting society. 521 F.2d at 271-72 & n.s. (Wright, J., dissenting). The purposes of
parole/probation are discussed in notes 63-74, 77-89 & 108-13 supra and accompanying text.
141. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
142. 521 F.2d at 263.
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him. The combination puts the parole officer into the position in which he can try to
guide the parolee into constructive development. 43
The probation officer must try to save "a man who has taken one wrong
step. 1 44 The parole officer is to be a guide, not a policeman. 145 The
parole/probation officer cannot trap a parolee/probationer for the police,
although he may cooperate with them. 146 A policeman cannot search the
parolee/probationer but can accompany the parole/probation officer on a
routine visit to the home of the parolee/probationer. 147 Although police may
be present when a parole/probation officer makes a search without probable
cause, they cannot make such a search on their own. This can produce a
situation where the parole/probation officer acts more as an agent of the police
for purposes of law enforcement than as an independent officer for the
purposes of rehabilitation. Moreover, a parole/probation officer is allowed to
search his "pal" whereas a police officer-whose job includes searches and
seizures-is not permitted to search a parolee/probationer even though there is
no trust relationship that would be violated by such a search. A proper visit
by a parole/probation officer can include an unwarranted search-as long as it
is based upon suspicion of wrongdoing. The blurring of parole/probation
officer and police officer roles makes the parole/probation officer's search
duties seem more punitive and less reconstructive. This situation cannot
encourage positive behavior in the parolee/probationer nor further his rela-
tionship with his parole/probation officer. Quite the contrary, it can only lead
to difficulty in defining what constitutes a reasonable search.
Reasonableness will always rest on the facts in a given situation. But before
there can be agreement on what is reasonable in any parole/probation search,
there must first be agreement on the role of the parole/probation officer and
clarification of the nature of the special relationship between that officer and
the parolee/probationer.
Julie S. Williamson
143. United States v. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972). For discussion of the parole
officer's role and the finding of "a striking absence of police ideology among parole officers," see
Yale Note, supra note 70, at 705. The authors recommended that parole officers not have the
power of penal sanctions, only the duties of a social worker. Id. at 704.
144. 521 F.2d at 263, quoting United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358 (1928).
145. 521 F.2d at 250.
146. 521 F.2d at 267.
147. Id.
